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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 






APPEAL NO. 890157 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THE RESPONDENT, GERALD COOK, by and through his counsel, 
Paul Van Dam and Kent M. Barry, respectfully submits the 
following BRIEF OF RESPONDENT in the above captioned matter. 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65B(i)(10). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Tracy Candelario was sentenced after entering a guilty 
plea to Aggravated Robbery on May 24, 1985. Judge Wilkinson of 
the Third Judicial District granted probation. 
2. On December 9, 1985, Candelario was arrested and 
subsequently charged with robbery. 
3. On February 7, 1986 he was brought before Judge 
Wilkinson on an Order to Show Cause why his probation should not 
be revoked. Candelario admitted to the allegations of the 
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Affidavit which were as follows: that he committed robbery, that 
he had failed to report to his probation officer, that he had 
failed to make restitution, and failed to participate in a 
program to complete community service hours as ordered by the 
court. 
4. On February 14, 1986, Candelario was sentenced on the 
robbery charge by Judge Sawaya to a term of one to 15 years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
5. On April 11, 1986, there was second Order to Show Cause 
Hearing. Alleged in the affidavit were the new robbery charge 
and the consequent prison commitment. These allegations were 
admitted and Candelario's probation was therefore revoked and he 
was committed to prison on the original aggravated robbery 
charge. The sentence of five to life was ordered to run 
concurrently with the one to 15 on the second robbery charge. 
6. Candelario brought this Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, claiming that the second Order to Show Cause Hearing 
violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant has not properly brought the issue of 
double jeopardy before this Court. It was raised and considered 
in the original habeas corpus action brought before J. Daniels in 
1987. The means of appealing that issue was, however, a direct 
appeal then, and not a subsequent habeas corpus action brought 
eighteen months later. The order denying the writ was based upon 
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res judicata. Therefore the appeal of this order raises only the 
propriety of the application of that doctrine. Appellant makes 
no claim that the doctrine was inapplicable or improperly applied 
and the ruling of J. Rokich should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT. 
A. The sole issue before the Court is the propriety of the 
J. Rokich determination that the doctrine of res judicata barred 
his reconsideration of J. Daniels' 1987 decision. 
The appellant is seeking review of the February 1989 
order of Judge Rokich. That order -dismissed [the action] with 
prejudice as being barred by the doctrine of res judicata and for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See; 
Order of J. Rokich, Addendum "B" to appellant's brief. The 
appellant gives no reason why the doctrine of res judicata would 
not preclude reconsideration by Judge Rokich of the arguments 
which had been presented to and rejected by Judge Daniels 
eighteen months earlier—the same arguments which the appellant 
seeks this Court to reconsider. 
The issue of this appeal cannot be the merits of J. 
Daniels' July 23, 1987 decision. That decision was not directly 
appealed within the appropriate time frame. Rather than appeal 
that decision directly the appellant attempted to bring the 
identical issues before Judge Rokich in 1989, and then appeal the 
new decision. The 1989 habeas corpus proceedings brought under 
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Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are no means of 
circumventing the direct appellate process required to appeal the 
prior decision of J. Daniels. 
Subsection 10 of Rule 65B provides: 
Any final judgment entered upon such complaint may 
be appealed to and reviewed by the Supreme Court 
of Utah as an appeal in civil cases. 
Rule 65B(10) Utah R. Civ. P. Since the proper means of appeal of 
the 1987 J. Daniels' decision was a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court then and not a new habeas corpus action filed eighteen 
months later, this Court should dismiss this appeal. At most 
this Court should consider whether or not Judge Rokich properly 
applied the doctrine of res judicata in refusing himself to 
reconsider the 1987 J. Daniels decision. 
B. Judge Rokich properly applied the doctrine of res 
judicata in denying subsequent review of J. Daniels' 1987 
decision. 
The application of the doctrine of res judicata to the 
writ filed before J. Rokich has been briefed by the respondents 
in their MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS. Curiously, 
the appellant advances no reason why the doctrine does not apply 
or that J. Rokich improperly applied the doctrine in dismissing 
the writ. 
The complaint filed before J. Rokich and the arguments 
sought to be advanced before this Court by appellant are mostly 
identical to those arguments brought before J. Daniels, namely 
that somehow the double jeopardy provisions of the Utah and 
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United States constitutions forbid the second probation 
revocation proceeding conducted by J. Wilkinson. In so far as 
the arguments are identical, there can be no question that the 
doctrine of res judicata has been properly applied. 
C. The appellant has waived the right to challenge service 
of process. 
An additional due process issue was raised in the writ 
before J. Rokich concerning the service of the affidavit in 
support of the order to show cause why probation should not be 
revoked. This is a particularly curious allegation. First of 
all# an examination of the order to show cause itself and the 
Affidavit in support thereof reveals service of process having 
been accomplished by agent Haywood on March 20, 1986. Even more 
interesting is that the crux of the appellant's double jeopardy 
argument is that the allegations in the affiavit in support of 
the order to show cause were the same as those in support of 
previous Order. This makes a complaint about lack of notice of 
the issues nonsensical. Perhaps most important though, is the 
fact that no complaint about service of process was made either 
at the order to show cause hearing or in the first application 
for writ before J. Daniels. By proceeding with the order to show 
cause and not raising the issue either at that hearing or in the 
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding before J. Daniels, the 
appellant has effectively waived his right to challenge service 
of process, and ought not be allowed to raise it in the 
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding before J. Rokich, or in the 
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proceeding before this Court. 
POINT II. CONSTITUTIONAL JEOPARDY PROVISIONS DO NOT APPLY TO 
PROBATION VIOLATION PROCEEDINGS. 
The appellant claims that the double jeopardy 
provisions of the United States and Utah constitutions should 
have precluded the April 11, 1986 hearing, since no new 
allegations of probation violations were made other than those 
which had already been raised at the February 7, 1986 hearing. 
This contention was specifically rejected by J. Daniels 
in his July 1987 ruling denying the appellant's petition for writ 
of habeas corpus. J. Daniels correctly noted that the Utah 
Supreme Court had not yet addressed this issue and relied upon 
the case of Davenport v. State, 574 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Crim.App. 
1978) to support his opinion that the double jeopardy provisions 
did not bar the April 11, 1986 hearing. 
Davenport also involved a case of multiple probation 
violation proceedings. The defendant in that case was on 
probation for a 1971 felony drug conviction. While on probation 
he was arrested for drunk driving. 
A hearing was held on October 21, 1976, and 
the trial court denied the State's motion to 
revoke. Subsequent thereto, on November 1, 
1976, the State filed another motion to 
revoke adult probation alleging as grounds 
the same factual basis that was alleged in 
the September 3 motion. 
Davenport. supra, at 74 (emphasis added). In ruling on the 
defendant's double jeopardy claim the Court considered the nature 
of probation violation proceedings and contrasted them to the 
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actual conviction process, determining that the probation 
violation process is really administrative in nature. The Court 
concluded: 
In light of the nature of the probation 
revocation proceeding, we hold that the 
double jeopardy protection of the Texas and 
United States Constitutions is not 
applicable. 
Id. at 75.l 
An important aspect of Davenport is that the Court did 
go so far as to deny the State's request to revoke the probation 
at the first hearing. There are also cases where the initial 
hearing was either continued or dismissed at the prosecution's 
request. See, e.g. State v. Ouarles, 761 P.2d 317 
(Kan.Ct.App.1988) and Smith v. State, 319 S.E.2d 113 
(Ga.Ct.Ap.1984). Those Courts have similarly denied the 
application of double jeopardy claims to multiple probation 
revocation proceedings. As the court noted in Smith. supra, 
[A] probation revocation hearing is similar 
to a preliminary hearing, and jeopardy does 
not attach at a preliminary hearing. A 
probation hearing is not a part of the 
criminal prosecution and is not a second 
sentencing, or second imposition of 
punishment for the same offense. As jeopardy 
An interesting claim made in Davenport not made here was 
that perhaps the subsequent hearing ought to have been barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata. That complaint was also rejected 
by the Court. 
"We hold the supervision of probationers is an 
administrative function of the courts and not a 
judicial function, and that the revocation hearing 
and the decision to revoke probation or not is 
administrative in nature. We therefore hold that 
the doctrine of res judicata does not apply." 
Id. 
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did not attach at the first hearing, even it 
was recessed for lack of sufficient evidence, 
the second hearing is not subject to an 
objection on the ground of double jeopardy. 
Smith, supra, 319 S.E.2d at 116.2 The Kansas court in Quarles 
came to a similar conclusion: 
We agree with the rationale of the majority 
of the decisions addressing this issue and 
hold that double jeopardy does not apply to 
probation revocation proceedings because 
probation revocation proceedings are not 
essentially criminal in nature. Since the 
purpose of the proceeding is to determine 
whether the probationer has violated the 
terms of probation, the probationer's risk 
does not equate to jeopardy in the 
constitutional sense. 
Quarles, supra, 761 P.2d at 320. 
Weakening the appellant's claim in the present case is 
the fact that the appellant admitted the allegations of probation 
violation, contesting them at neither hearing. The foregoing 
cases each involved minimally a contest of the probation 
violation allegations. In the present case it is only the 
Court's reconsideration of how to act upon the appellant's 
violation of his probation which is being challenged. 
The appellant claims that he should have been allowed 
to remain on probation in spite of his subsequent robbery 
conviction and commitment. This would give rise to the absurd 
result of expecting the appellant to fulfill the terms of a 
2
 This reasoning appears procedurally closest to Utah law 
in that Utah similarly employs a preliminary hearing system 
wherein jeopardy does not attach. See: S 76-1-403 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). 
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probation agreement and to be supervised by the Court and a 
probation officer while he was in prison. Probation serves as an 
alternative to prison commitment; after the subsequent commitment 
to prison, there was no longer any alternative to commitment in 
the previous case and the Court properly committed the appellant 
to prison in the April 1986 hearing.3 
CONCLUSION 
In any event, the J. Daniels ruling which the appellant 
sought to have reviewed by J. Rokich was proper. The double 
jeopardy provisions of the United States and Utah Constitutions 
do not apply to probation violation proceedings, as such 
proceedings are neither criminal prosecutions, or impositions of 
new sentences, but are merely civil determinations pertaining to 
reinstatement of originally pronounced orders of sentence. 
The appellant concludes his argument urging fairness. 
Respondent also urges fairness, and fairness dictates that one 
convicted of robbery while on probation for aggravated robbery 
ought to be committed to prison. The Court is therefore 
respectfully urged to affirm the decision of J. Rokich denying 
the relief request by the appellant. 
3This situation is most often avoided by continuing 
probation violation proceedings until after sentencing occurs on 
the new offense. 
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DATED THIS ^LA' OF AUGUST, 1989. 
KENT M. BARRY 
Attorney for Respondent 
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